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Intolerance of uncertainty (IU) is a dispositional tendency to find uncertain situations 
aversive and anxiety-provoking. There is limited understanding as to how IU may 
bias attention to uncertainty in the absence of direct threat. Here we examined the 
extent to which uncertain distractors and individual differences in IU impacted eye-
movements during an attentional capture task. Participants were asked to move their 
eyes towards a target, whilst ignoring an array of distractors. An additional distractor 
could appear before or after the target in a near or far location from the target. We 
observed high IU individuals to display fewer first saccades to the target in all 
conditions. The results were specific to IU, over trait anxiety. Overall, these results 
suggest that IU modulates attention to uncertainty in the absence of direct threat. 
Such findings inform the conceptualization of IU and its relation to psychopathology. 
 



























Individuals differ in the way in which they perceive and experience uncertainty. 
Intolerance of Uncertainty (IU) can be defined as a dispositional tendency to find 
uncertain situations aversive and anxiety provoking. A modern definition of IU has 
recently been put forward: ‘IU is an individual’s dispositional incapacity to endure the 
aversive response triggered by the perceived absence of salient, key, or sufficient 
information, and sustained by the associated perception of uncertainty’ (Carleton, 
2016, p. 31). Carleton (2016) suggests that IU may stem from a fundamental fear of 
the unknown. Historically, clinicians developed the self-reported IU scale (Freeston, 
Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994) to assess individual differences in 
uncertainty-induced anxiety related to Generalized Anxiety Disorder. However, IU 
has been identified as a transdiagnostic factor that cuts across many anxiety and 
mood disorders (Carleton, Fetzner, Hackl, & McEvoy, 2013; Gentes & Ruscio, 2011; 
McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012).  
A recent and emerging debate is whether IU can modulate psychological 
mechanisms in the absence of direct threat (Carleton, 2016; Pepperdine, Lomax, & 
Freeston, 2018; Shihata, McEvoy, Mullan, & Carleton, 2016). The majority of 
research has examined IU in relation to uncertain threat (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013; 
Tanovic, Gee, & Joormann, 2018). For example, during contexts with uncertain 
threat high IU individuals display heightened physiological responding and neural 
activity to both threat and safety cues (Chin, Nelson, Jackson, & Hajcak, 2016; 
Dunsmoor, Campese, Ceceli, LeDoux, & Phelps, 2015; Morriss, Christakou, & Van 
Reekum, 2015, 2016; Morriss, Macdonald, & van Reekum, 2016). Moreover, high IU 















distractors, indexed by larger landing position deviation of the eyes towards angry 
face distractors (Morriss et al., 2017). 
However, a handful of studies have also found IU to impact psychological 
processes in the absence of direct threat (Fergus, Bardeen, & Wu, 2013; Fergus & 
Carleton, 2016; Gorka, Nelson, Phan, & Shankman, 2016; Pepperdine et al., 2018). 
For example, experimental data show that high IU individuals are slower to react 
when there are multiple cues  (Fergus & Carleton, 2016) and show facilitated 
engagement with stimuli that convey uncertainty e.g. words related to uncertainty 
(Fergus et al., 2013). In addition, using a variety of scenarios, Pepperdine et al. 
(2018) observed IU to be associated with negative perceptions of uncertainty for all 
types of potential outcomes (e.g. negative, positive, none). Furthermore, in 
rewarding contexts with no chance of loss (threat), high IU individuals display greater 
engagement with uncertain reward (Gorka, Nelson, Phan, & Shankman, 2016).  
The findings outlined above suggest that IU operates under uncertain 
contexts with and without direct threat. Notably, research identifying IU-related 
biases in the absence of threat has primarily been attentional (Fergus et al., 2013; 
Fergus & Carleton, 2016). However, there is limited understanding as to which 
attentional processes are modulated by IU in the absence of direct threat. The 
majority of the literature on attentional bias and threat has focused on using the self-
reported Trait Anxiety measure (for review see Cisler & Koster, 2010). Therefore, to 
test the specificity of IU on attentional biases to uncertainty in the absence of direct 
threat it is important to compare and contrast against the commonly used Trait 
Anxiety measure. Identifying attentional processes that are specifically modulated by 















or absence, as well as determining potential diagnosis and treatment targets for IU-
based psychopathology (Shihata, McEvoy,Mullan, & Carleton, 2016).  
Here we propose to build on previous research to assess how IU may alter 
attentional processes during uncertainty in the absence of direct threat using an 
attentional capture task in combination with eye-tracking technology. In the current 
study we use a typical attentional capture task, which included elements of both 
spatial and temporal uncertainty (Theeuwes, De Vries, & Godijn, 2003; Theeuwes, 
Kramer, Hahn, Irwin, & Zelinsky, 1999). An array of four grey coloured circles are 
presented. Then, one circle remains grey and all the others change to red circles. 
The circle that remains grey is randomly allocated and acts as target. In this 
condition, there is some uncertainty as the location of the grey circle relative to the 
other red circles is spatially uncertain. On some of the trials, another red distractor 
circle can appear before or after the target in a near or far location from the target. In 
these conditions, there is more uncertainty, as the location of the grey circle relative 
to the other red circles is spatially uncertain and the timing of a new red distractor is 
temporally uncertain. The participant’s goal is to make a saccade (eye-movement) to 
the target, whilst ignoring the other distractors. In these tasks, participants typically 
make fewer first saccades with longer latencies to the target due to the abrupt onset 
of the distractor (i.e. the eyes move to the distractor instead of the target) 
(Theeuwes, De Vries, & Godijn, 2003; Theeuwes, Kramer, Hahn, Irwin, & Zelinsky, 
1999). Furthermore, fewer first saccades with longer latencies to the target are found 
when the presentation of the target and distractor are closer together: (1) spatially 
and (2) temporally (Theeuwes, Kramer, Hahn, Irwin & Zelinsky, 1999).  
In the current study we focus on saccade count and saccade latency 















(McSorley & Morriss, 2015; McSorley, Morriss, & van Reekum, 2016; Morriss, 
McSorley, & van Reekum, 2017). Based on previous work (Theeuwes, De Vries, & 
Godijn, 2003; Theeuwes, Kramer, Hahn, Irwin, & Zelinsky, 1999), we predicted all 
participants to have: (1) fewer first saccades with longer latencies directed to the 
target during the near distractor condition, compared to the far and no distractor 
conditions, and (2) fewer first saccades with longer latencies directed to the target 
when distractors were presented before the target, compared to after the target.  
We also expected individual differences in IU to account for substantial 
variance in the number of first saccades and their latencies, in line with our previous 
eyetracking work in IU during uncertain threat (Morriss et al., 2017). We expected 
higher IU to be associated with fewer first saccades and longer latencies to the 
target during the near distractor condition, compared to the far and no distractor 
conditions. Furthermore, we predicted that higher IU would be related to fewer first 
saccades and longer first saccade latencies to the target when distractors were 
presented before the target, compared to after the target. Lastly, we expected effects 
of task uncertainty on first saccades and saccade latency to be specific to IU over 
and above the Trait Anxiety measure (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & 
Jacobs, 1983). To keep in line with current transdiagnostic research and theory, we 
also examined the shortened IUS-12, and the prospective (P-IU) and inhibitory (I-IU) 
subscales (Carleton, Norton, & Asmundson, 2007), which can be derived from the 


















Fifty-nine volunteers (M age = 23.47, SD age = 4.57; 32 females and 27 males) took 
part. All observers had normal, or corrected to normal vision and were recruited 
through adverts placed around the campus area and word of mouth. All participants 
gave their informed consent prior to inclusion and were paid £5 for their time. The 




Self-reported IU (Freeston et al., 1994) and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) 
(Spielberger et al., 1983) were collected. The IU measure consisted of 27 items, 
example items included “I must get away from all uncertain situations” and 
“Uncertainty makes me uneasy, anxious, or stressed”. To check the specificity of IU, 
we compared it with the commonly used Trait Anxiety subscale from the STAI 
measure, consisting of 20 items.  
 
Apparatus 
Eye movements were recorded using an Eyelink II eye-tracker with a sampling rate 
of 500Hz (SR Research). Stimuli were presented on a 21” colour monitor with a 
refresh rate of 75Hz (DiamondPro, Sony). Head movements were constrained with a 
chin-rest at a viewing distance of 57 cm. The eye-tracker was calibrated using a 

















A cross (‘+’) 0.5 deg of visual angle in length was shown as a fixation marker. The 
experimental displays consisted of filled circles each 1 deg of visual angle in 
diameter and presented on a black background. Circles were either grey or red.  
 
Design 
The initial screen consisted of a fixation cross and four grey circles displayed 9 deg 
of visual angle from the fixation cross on the oblique axes. After a random display 
duration of 800-1200 ms, three of the circles turned red leaving one circle grey, and 
this remained on screen for a display duration of 1 second. Participants were 
required to saccade to the remaining grey circular target. On 66% of trials a new red 
circle was also displayed. This was presented on one of the principal axes 9 deg of 
visual angle horizontally or vertically with respect to the fixation cross, either 75 ms 
prior to or 75 ms after the circles change. The new stimulus was near or far from the 
target in a clockwise or counter-clockwise direction in an equivalent proportion of 
trials (for example, see Fig 1). Overall there were 96 trials per participant. 32 trials 
contained no new stimulus. The 64 remaining trials contained the new stimulus with 
12 trials per location relative to the target: near clockwise, far clockwise, near 
counter-clockwise, far counter-clockwise; and 6 per stimulus onset asynchrony (new 
red circle shown 75 ms before or after the grey target is revealed). Results are 
presented collapsed across the direction of the new red stimulus (clockwise and 

















Participants were instructed to “saccade to remaining grey circle” to “ignore the new 
red stimulus”. Once comfortable with the task, the eye tracker was fitted and a 
calibration procedure was performed before they carried out the task. 
 
Eye-tracking Measures   
Saccade start and endpoints were identified using a 22°/s velocity and 8000°/s2 
acceleration criteria. The amplitude and latency of the saccade were extracted for 
the first saccade response. First saccades were excluded from further analysis if 
saccade amplitude was less than 2 deg of visual angle (0.14%) or if response 
latency was quicker than 80 ms (classified as an anticipatory saccade) or slower 
than 800 ms (in these cases the saccade is taken as having not been driven by the 
experimental display) (0.006%). Saccade counts and average saccade latencies are 
reported. 
 
[Figure 1 near here] 
  
Analyses 
The analyses were conducted using the mixed procedure in SPSS 21.0 
(SPSS, Inc; Chicago, Illinois). We conducted separate multilevel models on first 
saccade count and first saccade latency by entering Distractor (none, near, far) at 
level 1 and individual subjects at level 2, with IU, and STAI entered as individual 
difference predictor variables in no particular order. Furthermore, to examine the 
impact of distractor type and time we included additional multilevel models on first 
saccade count and first saccade latency. We entered Distractor (near, far) and Time 















entered as individual difference predictor variables. For exploratory purposes, 
additional models on first saccade count and first saccade latency with IUS-12 and 
STAI, as well as P-IU, I-IU and STAI were included. For all models, we used a 
diagonal covariance matrix for level 1. Random effects included a random intercept 
for each individual subject, where a variance components covariance structure was 
used. Fixed effects included Distractor or Distractor and Time. We used maximum 
likelihood estimators.  
We report the specificity of IU with respect to STAI where a significant 
interaction of IU with Distractor, Time or Distractor x Time was observed. Then, we 
perform follow-up pairwise comparisons on the estimated marginal means, adjusted 
for the predictor variables (IU, STAI). Any interaction with IU was followed up with 
pairwise comparisons of the means between the conditions for IU estimated at the 
specific values of + or - 1 SD of mean IU. These data are estimated from the 
multilevel model of the entire sample, not unlike performing a simple slopes analysis 
in a multiple regression analysis (Morriss, MacDonald, & van Reekum, 2016; 




Similar distributions and internal reliability of scores were found for the anxiety 
measures: IU (M= 67.80, SD= 17.37, range= 29-100, α = .93); Trait Anxiety (M= 
42.10, SD= 10.78, range= 24-60, α = .92); IUS-12 (M= 31.03, SD= 8.25, range= 13-
46, α = .87), P-IU (M= 19.74, SD= 5.30, range= 8-31, α = .82): and I-IU (M= 11.28, 

















First saccade count: We found a main effect of distractor type on first saccade 
count [Distractor: F(1,224.382)=35.959, p<.001] (see Table 1). Follow up pairwise 
comparisons revealed  more first saccades to the target during the no distractor, 
followed by the far distractor and near distractor conditions, p’s < .050. Low IU was 
associated with more first saccades to the target for each distractor condition, over 
high IU [Distractor x IU: F(1,59)=5.657, p=.002] (see Fig 2). A similar pattern was 
observed for first saccade count and STAI but it was not significant [Distractor x 
STAI: F(1,59)=2.447, p=.073]. No other significant interactions for first saccade count 
were observed for distractor type and IUS-12, P-IU, and I-IU, max F = 1.515, p = 
.217. 
There were more first saccade to the target when the distractors were 
presented after the target, compared to before the target [Time: 
F(1,159.292)=44.351, p<.001] (see Table 1). Furthermore, there were more first 
saccades to the target when the distractor was far and after the target, compared to 
when the distractor was near and after the target [Distractor x Time: 
F(1,159.292)=5.701, p=.018]. No other significant interactions for first saccade count 
were observed for distractor x time and IU,STAI, IUS-12, P-IU, and I-IU, max F = 
3.814, p = .053. 
 
First saccade latency: We found a main effect of distractor type on first saccade 
latency [Distractor: F(1,58.320)=44.903, p<.001] (see Table 1). Follow up pairwise 
comparisons showed that the first saccade latency was shorter for the no distractor, 
versus near and far distractors, p’s < .001.The first saccade latency for near and far 















for first saccade latency were observed for distractor type and IU,STAI, IUS-12, P-IU, 
and I-IU, max F = 2.375, p = .102. 
First saccade latencies were shorter for distractors presented after the target, 
compared to distractors presented before the target [Distractor x Time: 
F(1,169.499)=6.052, p=.015]. No other significant interactions for first saccade 
latency were observed for distractor x time and IU,STAI, IUS-12, P-IU, and I-IU, max 
F = 3.356, p = .069. 
 
[Table 1 near here] 
[Figure 2 near here] 
 
Relationships between IU items and total first saccade count 
Additional posthoc analyses were conducted to examine the relationship between 
each IU item and total first saccade count across conditions (none, near and far). We 
collapsed first saccade count across all conditions, as similar IU effects were 
observed across all conditions. The majority of the IU items were normally distributed 
(i.e. skewness and kurtosis values between 2 and -2). However, a few of the items 
displayed skew over 1 (item 2 and 23) and kurtosis over 1 (items 2, 17, 20 and 24). 
Due to some of the items having mild skew and kurtosis, as well as the Likert scale 
data for each item being ordinal, we conducted Spearmans Rho correlations 
between each full scale IU item and total first saccade count1. The results revealed 
significant negative correlations between IU items 13, 14, 24 and 25 with total first 
saccade count, rs (57) > .264, p < .05 (see Table 2). Thus, a higher score on these 
                                                 
1 The results were similar when conducting correlations using Pearson’s tests. IU 
items 3 and 7 moved from trend to significance, p’s <.05, whilst IU items 13 and 14 















items was associated with fewer first saccade counts. IU items, 13, 14, and 24 are 
from the full IU scale, whilst IU item 25 is included in both the full IU scale and IUS-
12. 
 




In the present study, we show that self-reported IU is associated with reduced 
attentional inhibition in the absence of direct threat. The IU findings were specific and 
predicted variance over and above that shared with the commonly used Trait Anxiety 
measure. Taken together, these results further our understanding of how IU 
modulates attention in the absence of direct threat, which will be relevant to 
theoretical models of IU (Carleton, 2016). 
 For the attentional capture task, we found that in general participants 
exhibited a greater number of first saccades with shorter latencies to the target in the 
no distractor condition, followed by far and near distractor conditions (Theeuwes, De 
Vries, & Godijn, 2003; Theeuwes, Kramer, Hahn, Irwin, & Zelinsky, 1999). 
Importantly, high IU was associated with fewer first saccades to the target, 
regardless of the type of distractor or time of distractor. IU was not found to predict 
saccade latency. These results suggest that the distractors interfered with spatial 
and temporal attention in all participants, as indexed by first saccade count and 
latency respectively. However, for high IU individuals, the distractors interfered more 
with spatial attention, as measured by first saccade count. The IU-related findings 















be associated with slower reaction times when there are multiple cues and facilitated 
engagement with uncertain word stimuli embedded amongst other stimuli (Fergus, 
Bardeen, & Wu, 2013; Fergus & Carleton, 2016). In addition, this finding sits 
alongside recent eye-tracking work where high IU individuals were found to exhibit 
difficulties inhibiting unpredictable angry faces (Morriss et al., 2017). In relation to the 
IU literature as a whole (for review see Tanovic et al., 2018), the current finding 
provides further evidence that IU is capable of modulating attention during uncertain 
contexts in the absence and presence of threat.   
The results from this study suggest that individuals high in IU have difficulty 
with spatial attention, particularly when there is uncertainty. Although, an alternative 
explanation could be that individuals high in IU have a difficulty with attention globally 
as they displayed fewer first saccades across all conditions. Notably, all the 
conditions contained an element of spatial uncertainty, even the no distractor 
condition, as participants were unable to predict the location of the target. Therefore, 
a more plausible explanation would be that individuals high in IU display difficulty 
with spatial attention across contexts, particularly uncertain ones. This interpretation 
is in line with previous findings that have shown individuals high in IU to only exhibit 
attentional biases to distractors in contexts with greater spatial uncertainty (Morriss 
et al., 2017). To understand the role of IU on attention further, future research should 
focus on manipulating different levels of spatial and temporal uncertainty. 
The empirical evidence presented here supports recent IU theory. The current 
study shows that IU can operate in the absence of direct threat. Carleton (2016) 
suggests that IU may stem from the fear of the unknown. Therefore, uncertainty in 
itself is aversive enough to trigger particular cognitive, emotional and behavioural 















way the field understands IU-related psychopathology, as the majority of previous 
research has focused on uncertain threat (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013; Tanovic, Gee, & 
Joormann, 2018). More empirical research is needed to clarify why uncertainty in the 
absence of threat is aversive (Shihata, McEvoy, Mullan, & Carleton, 2016). For 
example, it will be important to identify whether distinct psychological mechanisms 
are modulated by uncertainty and threat differently e.g. attentional inhibition versus 
associative learning. This will be important for determining whether a given 
mechanism is: (1) equally modulated by uncertainty in the absence and presence of 
threat, or (2) linearly modulated by the uncertainty and threat level. The revelation of 
these aspects of IU will help pave the way for the development of appropriate 
transdiagnostic treatments for IU-related psychopathology. 
Significant effects of the IUS-12, P-IU or I-IU on the eyetracking measures 
were not observed in the current experiment, despite the results being in a similar 
direction to the full IU scale. Moreover, it was revealed that more IU items from the 
full scale, compared to the IUS-12 predicted total first saccade target count. This is 
interesting given that current research examining the IU questionnaire has preferred 
the IUS-12, given its consistent and robust psychometrics (Carleton, Norton, & 
Asmundson, 2007; Hong & Lee, 2015). The full IU scale was originally devised to 
examine generalized anxiety disorder (Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 
1998) and contains other item content which may be less specific to uncertainty 
(Carleton, Norton, & Asmundson, 2007). Notably, the IU items that significantly 
correlated with the total first saccade target count were related to confidence, 
motivation and sleep. Given these findings, it is possible that relationships between 















needed to disentangle the role of the full IU scale versus IUS-12 and its subscales 
on attention.  
The present study had a few limitations which should be addressed in future 
research to assess the robustness and generalizability of the findings reported here. 
The experiment was conducted on an unselected community sample. Further work 
should aim to replicate the experiment in different laboratories and populations, to 
examine how common the effect of IU on attention is across community samples, 
and to parcel out which clinical samples it may be most relevant for.  
 In conclusion, individual differences in IU predicted attentional inhibition of 
uncertain distractors in the absence of threat, over and above Trait Anxiety. 
Importantly, these results highlight an opportunity for further research to examine 
how IU modulates other psychological processes in the absence/presence of 
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 Summary of means (SD) for the attentional capture task 










































                
Note: First saccade count is the number of correct first saccades to the target quadrant; First saccade 
latency measured in milliseconds, ms; -75 ms is the presentation time of the distractor before the 


























Spearmans Rho correlations between IU items and total first saccade count 
IU item 
number IU item text 
r values  
   
1 Uncertainty stops me from having a firm opinion. -.076 
2 Being uncertain means that a person is disorganized. .056 
3 Uncertainty makes life intolerable. -.231† 
4 It's not fair that there are no guarantees in life. -.186 
5 My mind can't be relaxed if I don’t know what will happen tomorrow. -.193 
6 Uncertainty makes me uneasy, anxious, or stressed. -.101 
7 Unforeseen events upset me greatly.  -.233† 
8 It frustrates me not having all the information I need. -.063 
9 Uncertainty keeps me from living a full life. -.068 
10 One should always look ahead so as to avoid surprises. -.132 
11 
A small unforeseen event can spoil everything, even with the best of 
planning. -.154 
12 When it's time to act uncertainty paralyzes me. -.164 
13 Being uncertain means that I am not first rate. -.287* 
14 When I am uncertain I can't go forward. -.280* 
15 When I am uncertain I can't function very well. -.136 
16 Unlike me, others always seem to know where they are going with their 
lives. 
.001 
17 Uncertainty makes me vulnerable, unhappy, or sad. -.099 
18 I always want to know what the future has in store for me. -.177 
19 I hate being taken by surprise. -.088 
20 The smallest doubt stops me from acting. .004 
21 I should be able to organize everything in advance. -.103 
22 Being uncertain means that I lack confidence. -.125 
23 I think it's unfair that other people seem sure about their future. -.083 
24 Uncertainty stops me from sleeping well. -.264* 
25 I must get away from uncertain situations. -.289* 
26 The ambiguities in life stress me. -.078 
27 I can't stand being undecided about my future. -.073 
      
Note: * Asterisks represent significance p < .05. † Crosses represent trend findings p < .1. First 
saccade count is the number of correct first saccades to the target quadrant for all conditions 
















Fig 1. Image depicting the attentional capture task. A fixation screen was shown 
initially consisting of a fixation cross and four grey circles. After a random display 
duration of between 800-1200 milliseconds, three of the circles turned red leaving 
one circle grey and remained on screen for a display duration of 1 second. 
Participants were required to saccade to the remaining grey circular target. Distractor 
conditions included: (A) None, (B) Far, (C) Near.  
Fig 2. Bar graphs depicting IU estimated at + or - 1 SD of mean IU (controlling for 
STAI) from the multilevel model analysis of first saccade counts to the target. Low IU 
was associated with more first saccades to the target for all distractor conditions, 
compared to high IU. Bars represent standard error estimated at + or – 1 SD of 

































































































• Intolerance of uncertainty (IU) is a tendency to find uncertainty anxiety-
provoking 
• We examined how IU impacts attentional capture in the absence of threat 
• High IU was associated greater attentional capture to uncertain distractors 
• These findings will further the conceptualisation of IU  
